21. Genoud, Testament of Adolf Hitler, p. 63, 15 February 1945. In 1945 Hitler maintained that his primary motives were strategic and economic: ‘War with Russia had become inevitable, whatever we did’ (p. 66).

22. Förster, ‘Hitler Turns East’, pp. 121, 126.

23. Ueberschär and Wette, ‘Unternehmen Barbarossa’, p. 107; von Below, At Hitler’s Side, pp. 91–2.

24. H. Trevor-Roper (ed.) Hitler’s War Directives 1939–1945 (London, 1964), p. 86; Gorodetsky, Grand Delusion, pp. 67–75.

25. F. W. Seidler and D. Zeigert Die Führerhauptquartiere: Anlagen und Planungen im Zweiten Weltkrieg (Munich, 2000), pp. 193–6.

26. Trevor-Roper, Hitler’s War Directives, pp. 93–4.

27. Förster, ‘Hitler Turns East’, p. 127.

28. Förster, ‘Hitler Turns East’, p. 129; A. Hillgruber ‘The German Military Leaders’ View of Russia prior to the Attack on the Soviet Union’, in Wegner, From Peace To War, pp. 172, 182.

29. Trevor-Roper, Hitler’s War Directives, pp. 130–31, Directive no. 32 ‘Preparations for the Period after Barbarossa’; Taylor, Goebbels Diaries, p. 414.

30. K. Alt ‘Die Wehrmacht im Kalkül Stalins’, in R.-D. Müller and H.-E. Volkmann (eds) Die Wehrmacht: Mythos und Realität (Munich, 1999), pp. 107–9.

31. D. Glantz Stumbling Colossus: the Red Army on the Eve of World War (Lawrence, Kans., 1998), pp. 90–93.

32. Glantz, Stumbling Colossus, pp. 95–6.

33. Tarleton, ‘Stalin Line’, p. 50; C. Roberts ‘Planning for War: the Red Army and the Catastrophe of 1941’, Europe – Asia Studies, 47 (1995), p. 1319; Glantz, Stumbling Colossus, pp. 103–4.

34. Nevezhin, ‘Pact with Germany’, p. 821.

35. Alt, ‘Die Wehrmacht’, p. 111; L. A. Bezyminsky ‘Stalins Rede vom 5 Mai 1941 – neu dokumentiert’, in G. R. Ueberschär and L. A. Bezminsky (eds) Der deutsche Angriff auf die Sowjetunion 1941: Die Kontroverse um die Präventivkriegsthese (Darmstadt, 1998), pp. 136–41; see too J. Förster and E. Mawdsley ‘Hitler and Stalin: Secret Speeches on the Eve of Barbarossa’, War in History, 11 (2004), pp. 88–100 for recent versions of the 5 May speech.

36. Förster and Mawdsley, ‘Hitler and Stalin’, pp. 101–2.

37. V. A. Nevezhin ‘The Making of Propaganda concerning USSR Foreign Policy, 1939–1941’, in N. Rosenfeldt, J. Jensen and E. Kulavig (eds) Mechanisms of Power in the Soviet Union (London, 2000), pp. 159–60; Nekrich, Pariahs, Partners, p. 241; Förster and Mawdsley, ‘Hitler and Stalin’, pp. 86–7 for the reaction to the 5 May speech.

38. Nekrich, Pariahsy Partners, pp. 228–9.

39. Glantz, Stumbling Colossus, pp. 239–43.

40. G. F. Krivosheev Soviet Casualties and Combat Losses in the Twentieth Century (London, 1997), p. 98; R. Stolfi Hitler’s Panzers East: World War II Reinterpreted (Norman, Okl., 1991), pp. 88–9; A. G. Chor’kov ‘The Red Army during the Initial Phase of the Great Patriotic War’, in Wegner, From Peace to War, p. 416.

41. For details see D. M. Glantz Before Stalingrad: Barbarossa – Hitler’s Invasion of Russia 1941 (Stroud, 2003), chs 7–8; Trevor-Roper, Hitler’s War Directives, pp. 152–5, Directive no. 35, 6 September 1941.

42. J. Toland Adolf Hitler (London, 1976), pp. 684–5.

43. V. P. Yampolsky (ed.) Organy Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti SSSR v Velikoi Otechestvennoi voine (Moscow, 2000), vol. ii, pp. 98–104.

44. Yampolsky, Organy, p. 107.

45. D. Volkogonov Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy (London, 1991), pp. 434–5; G. A. Bordiugov The Popular Mood in the Unoccupied Soviet Union’, in R. Thurston and B. Bonwetsch (eds) The People’s War: Responses to World War II in the Soviet Union (Chicago, 2000), pp. 58–9; M. M. Gorinov ‘Muscovites’ Moods, 22 June 1941 to May 1942’, in Thurston and Bonwetsch, People’s War, pp. 123–4; J. Barber ‘The Moscow Crisis of October 1941’, in J. Cooper, M. Perrie and E. A. Rees (eds) Soviet History 1917–1953: Essays in Honour ofR.W. Davies (London, 1995), pp. 201–18.

46. M. Cooper The German Army 1933–1945 (London, 1978), p. 344.

47. Alt, ‘Die Wehrmacht’, p. 111.

48. Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht 5 vols (Frankfurt am Main, 1961–3), vol. i, pp. 1120–21; Soviet fi gures calculated from J. Erickson ‘Soviet War Losses’, in J. Erickson and D. Dilks (eds) Barbarossa: the Axis and the Allies (Edinburgh, 1994), pp. 264–5.

49. E. Zaleski Stalinist Planning for Economic Growth 1933–1952 (London, 1980), p. 291; S. Linz ‘World War II and Soviet Economic Growth, 1940–1953’, in S. Linz (ed.) The Impact of World War II on the Soviet Union (Totowa, NJ, 1985)” p. 13.

50. W. S. Dunn The Soviet Economy and the Red Army 1930–1945 (London, 1995), p. 195.

51. Linz, ‘Soviet Economic Growth’, p. 18; Imperial War Museum, London, FD 3056/49 ‘Statistical Material on the German Manpower Position During the War’, 31 July 1945. These fi gures are based on the annual labour balances produced by the

Reich Statistical Offi ce. The German manpower fi gure includes those classifi ed as ‘handworkers’ as well. Industrial wage-earners numbered 8.37 million in 1942.

52. S. R. Lieberman ‘Crisis Management in the USSR: The Wartime System of Administration and Control’, in Linz, Impact of World War II, pp. 60–61.

53. Zaleski, Stalinist Planning, pp. 287–8; M. Harrison Soviet Planning in Peaceand War, 1938–1945 (Cambridge, 1985), pp. 94–9; Lieberman, ‘Crisis Management’, pp. 60–66.

54. Zaleski, Stalinist Planning, pp. 286, 289–90.

55. Zaleski, Stalinist Planning, p. 317; M. Harrison ‘The Soviet Union: the defeated victor’, in M. Harrison (ed.) The Economics of World War II: Six great powers in international comparison (Cambridge, 1998), pp. 275–8.

56. Linz, ‘Soviet Economic Growth’, p. 20; Harrison, ‘The Soviet Union’, p. 286.

57. F. Kagan ‘The Evacuation of Soviet Industry in the Wake of Barbarossa: a Key to Soviet Victory’, Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 8 (1995), pp. 389–406; G. A. Kumanev ‘The Soviet Economy and the 1941 Evacuation’, in J. L. Wieczynski (ed.) Operation Barbarossa: The German Attack on the Soviet Union, June 22 1941 (Salt Lake City, 1993), pp. 161–81, 189.

58. Linz, ‘Soviet Economic Growth’, p. 17 on investment; on schools M. Hindus Russia Fights On (London, 1942), pp. 63–4; W. Moskoff The Bread of Affl iction: The Food Supply in the USSR during World War II (Cambridge, 1990), p. 83.

59. Linz, ‘Soviet Economic Growth’, pp. 19–20; J. Barber and M. Harrison The Soviet Home Front 1941–1945 (London, 1991), pp. 147–52 on labour mobilization. On rationing Zaleski, Stalinist Planning, pp. 328–30; Moskoff, Bread of Affl iction, pp. 143–55; Barber and Harrison, Soviet Home Front, pp. 214–15 for ration levels in 1944.