Strategikon des Maurikios: corpus fontium historiae Byzantinae. Vol. XVII/ Ed. G. Dennis, Übers. E. Gamillscheg. Wien, 1981.

Ulrich J. Barbarische Gesellschaftsstrucktur und römische Aussenpolitik zu Beginn der Völkerwanderung. Ein Versuch zu den Westgoten 365–377. Bonn, 1995.

Volbach F. Elfenbeinarbeien der Spätantike und des frühen Mittelalters. Mainz, 1976.

Whitby M. The army c. 420–602 // Cambridge Ancient History. Vol. 14. Chapter 11. Cambridge, P. 288–314.

Woodrow P. Byzantine miltary technology and and strategy as observed in Strategikon of Maurice [без даты и места издания].

Zâstërovâ В. Les Avars et les Slavs dans la Tactique de Maurice. Praha, 1971.

Zosime. Histoire nouvelle. T. П. 2e partie / textes établi et traduit par F. Paschoud. Paris, 1979.

Zuckerman C. Les «Barbares» romaines: au sujet de l» origine des auxilia tétrarchiques H L» armée romaine et les Barbares du IIIe au VIIe siècle / Ed. F. Vallet, M. Kazanski. Paris, 1993. P. 17–20.

Zuckerman C. Sur la date du traité militaire de Végèce et son destinataire Valentinien П H Scripta classica Israelica. 1994. ХШ: 67–74.

Zuckerman C. Comtes et ducs en Egypte autour de l» an 400 et la date de la Notitia Dignitatem Orientis H Antiquité tardive, 6. 1998. P. 147–197.

Zuckerman C. L» armée / Le monde Byzantine. Tome I: L» Empire romain d» Orient 330–641 / Sous la direction de C. Morrisson. Paris, 2004. Chapitre V. P. 143–180.

SUMMARY

The Secret of Justinian» s Army:

The Eastern Roman Army in 491–641 A.D

Introductory Chapter («The Puzzle of Justinian» s Reconquest») is devoted to explaining why under the emperor Justinian (527–565) the Roman army could reconquer for a while all what had been lost by the Empire for the preceding one hundred years. This matter is really worthy of explanation because during just two decades of the re-conquest (533–552) Justinian restored control over the same territories that had formerly been seized by the Roman Republic after two centuries of extremely hard fighting — from the First Samnite war through the Third Punic war (343–146 B.C.).

Chapters 1 («The Age of Changes») and 2 («The Legacy of the Tetrarchs: the Later Roman Administration and the Army») provide a brief survey of the position of the Empire and of the condition of its army as well by the early 6th century. The most terrible defeat of the Later Roman troops by the barbarian peoples took place on 290

August 9, 379 near the city of Adrianople (in Thrace), when the emperor Valens» army was smashed by the Goths and their allies. Among its chief reasons were not only Valens» own strategic errors, but also the tactical advantage of the Gothic and Alanic cavalry over the Roman mounted force. The disaster at Adrianople had to make the deepest impression upon the military elite of the Empire and so to lead to a revision of the entire imperial war doctrine. Somewhat later already, the military theoretician Vegetius wrote that the Roman cavalry of his days is organized per sample of the Goths and Alans. To all appearances, after 378 the Romans actively began to adopt the barbarian experiences of conducting a mobile battle with the use of large masses of cavalry, some armed with lances like the Goths and the Alans, others — with bows like the Huns. In the text of a later military treatise, «Strategikon» by Pseudo-Maurice, there is a description of equestrian exercises, which rather date from a period of around the 4th — 5th centuries. There are references to five kinds of such mounted training, viz. «Scythian», «Alanic», «African», «Illyrian» and «Italic». The origins of the first two exercises seem to go back to the events of the late 4th century. Nevertheless, in spite of these reforms, the Romans lacked their own well-trained light-armed cavalry, as not so many Roman cavalrymen could be compared to the nomads, spending all the life on horseback, in the art of horse-riding and bow-shooting. And so, since 394 up to 439, under the outstanding Roman generals such as Stilicho, Aetius and others, in the composition of the Roman army there were mounted troops consisting of Hun mercenaries, who repeatedly demonstrated their high martial skills. In the former half 291 of the 5th century, the Roman army, as it would seem, increased a role of cavalry; however, in the 470s we can observe again the previous, infantry-based, army structure in the Balkans. The catastrophic defeats and failures that occurred in the late 4th and in the mid-5th centuries certainly forced the conservative Roman military elite to revise the obsolete principles of waging war. Nevertheless, this revision process went so slowly that the infantry remained as the main army force until the end of the 5th century. Just the reforms of the next century changed such a situation at last! Since then, the role of infantry became auxiliary only, whereas the main place in the army composition and fighting activities passed on to cavalry.

In Chapter 3 («The Barbarians and Barbarian Innovations in the Army: auxilia, mimeri, foederati, buccel-larii») the author joins the opinions expressed by D. Hoffman (1969), R. Schulz (1993); R. Scharf (2001), E. P. Glushanin (1991), M. Speidel (1994), O. Schmitt (1994) and J. Haldon (1984), as well as refutes the schemes put forward by F. Aussaresses (1906; 1909). In particular, he states that the foederati as a kind of armed forces must have appeared no earlier than during the reign of Theodosius I (379–395), who seems to have organized two or three tens of such new units numbering 10,000—15,000 soldiers in total and composed mostly of Goths. This deduction looks plausible, indeed, because later on, for instance in the 6th century,